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TORTS: NEW YORK ALLOWS CLAIM FOR INJURIES
RESULTING FROM FRIGHT NEGLIGENTLY INDUCED
AND REPUDIATES ITS "IMPACT" RULE
SINCE the leading case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. in 1897,1 New
York courts have refused to allow recovery for physical and mental
injuries resulting from negligently-induced fright unless the frigft
was accompanied by an actual physical "impact." 2  In the recent case
of Battalla v. State,3 however, the New York Court of Appeals, in a
four to three opinion expressly overruling Mitchell, held that an
allegation that plaintiff was caused to suffer "severe emotional, neuro-
logical disturbance with residual physical manifestations"4 stated a cause
of action; therefore recovery could be obtained for the physical and
mental injuries resulting from fright if the plaintiff could prove her
injuries were proximately caused by defendant's negligence.5
When English courts were first presented with claims for damages
allegedly caused by mental disturbance, they took the position that
normal persons do not suffer injury from fright or shock. Therefore
if such injuries did in fact occur they were held to be too remote as a
matter of law.8 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.' was one of the first major
1 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
'See Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 98, 134 (.959).
I o N.Y.zd 237, 176 N.E.2d 7z9, 2i9 N.Y.S.2d 34 (i96i).
'176 N.E.zd at 729. Plaintiff, a nine-year old girl, alleged that she boarded a
chair ski-lift at its top terminal. Due to the alleged negligence of an attendant-
employee, the safety belt was not properly secured and locked. As a result of this
negligence, the plaintiff claimed that she became frightened and hysterical during the
descent, with consequential injuries.
5 176 N.E. at 732.
'See Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L.J.P.C. 69 (P.C.
x888). The court in the Coultas case took the position that physical injuries could
not be the natural and probable consequence of psychic stimulation. However, England
very early repudiated this extreme position. In Dulieu v. White, [i9oi] 2 K.B. 669,
the court held' that physical injury could be proximately caused by fright, but qualified,
their holding by the statement that "the shock, where it operates through the mind,
must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to
oneself." Id. at 675. Later, In Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., ['9z5] I K.B. 141 (C.A.),
even this qualification was ignored, and recovery was allowed for the miscarriage and
ultimate death of a mother resulting from fear that her child had been injured by a
runaway lorry. England, therefore, has moved a long way 'from the Coultas case,
although the exact status of the English law seems to be in doubt. See King v.
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American decisions on the subject.8 The defendant's employee in the
Mitchell case allegedly drove his horse car so negligently that the plain-
tiff, a pregnant woman waiting to board the car, was put in extreme peril
of being run down. Although plaintiff was not touched by the horses,
they came so dose that she was standing between their heads when
they were finally reined up. The plaintiff was terrified and shortly
thereafter had a miscarriage. The court held that plaintiff could not
recover for the physical consequences of her fright.
From the Mitchell holding, the rule developed that there could be
no recovery for physical injury resulting from mental distress unless
there was, coincident in time and place with the occasion producing the
mental stress, some physical impact resulting from defendant's fault.'
This "impact" requirement soon became the majority American rule.' 0
From the beginning, however, dissatisfaction with the harsh results
Phillips, [1952] a All E.R. 459, 2 T.L.R. 277 (Q.B.D.), aff'd [1953] x All E.R.
617 (C.A.), 69 L.Q. REV. 347 (953) ; Hay v. Bourhill, [1943] A.C. 92.
5x1 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
SSee Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1oo, 135 (1959). See also note ix, infra.
'Id. at 134.
10See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d xoo, 134 (1959). See also 11 HARV. L. REV. 202
(1897). Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 208 (1944)
, 
states: "Three early decisions have
been lighthouse cases in the development of American law on the subject." Besides the
Mitchell case, 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (x896), Smith cites Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., x68 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (x897), and Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 2io,
13 S.W. 59 (189o). In the Spade case a conductor caused a young lady passenger to be-
come sick from fright occasioned by the manner in which he ejected a drunken passenger.
The court, in denying recovery, recognized that real injury could be caused by fright
but reasoned that where there is no injury to the person from without, it would be
unreasonable to hold defendants bound to anticipate and guard against fright and the
consequences thereof. The court frankly admitted that the real reason for denying
recovery was the fear of fraudulent claims.
The third clighthouse" case, Hill v. Kimball, however, is said to have "presaged
the ultimate trend of American law." Smith, supra at 209. In Hill the defendant
landlord, aware of his tenants pregnancy and susceptibility to injury through excite-
ment, came onto the premises and violently attacked two Negroes in her presence,
causing the tenant to suffer a miscarriage. Justice Gaines recognized that no precedent
existed for allowing recovery, but held that lack of precedent alone was not sufficient
reason to bar a claim. He stated: "That a physical personal injury may be produced
through strong emotion of mind there can be no doubt. The fact that it is more
difficult to produce such an injury through the operation of the mind than by direct
physical means affords no sufficient ground for refusing compensation in an action at
law when the injury is intentionally or negligently inflicted. It may be more difficult
to prove the connection between the alleged cause and the injury, but if it be proved,
and the injury be the proximate result of the cause, we cannot say that a recovery
should not be had." Hill v. Kimball, supra at 215.
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occasioned by applications of the new rule' led many courts either to
limit'2 or to repudiate it.'" The major limitation was created by the
"1 The kind of results obtained by the use of an "impact" requirement are graphically
pictured in the following example. "If A, by his negligence, brushes slightly against
B, a pregnant woman, and while doing her no injury by the impact, yet frightens her
so badly that a nervous shock results from the fright-not from the impact--and the
nervous shock causes B to have a miscarriage, it is admitted that she may recover from
A for the physical pain and suffering endured by her in the shock and miscarriage.
But, it is said, if A is driving negligently on the street, and stops his horse within a.
few inches of impact with B, but frightens her just as badly as in the former case,
with the resultant nervous shock and miscarriage, B may not recover from A, albeit her
physical injury is just as great as before and just as much due to A's fault. A rule of
liability so highly technical, so completely without foundation in reason, is not out of
place in a primitive system of jurisprudence, but is unworthy of any system based on
the theory of granting redress for every substantial wrong." Throckmorton, Damager
for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 26o, 278 (1921).
In the narrow area of miscarriage allegedly caused by fright or shock, an interesting-
note in i5 U. CHi. L. REV. 188 (1947), contends that according to the overwhelm'ing
weight of medical opinion, miscarriage cannot be caused by fright alone.
" Probably the two most important limitations are:
i) The impact does not need to be inflicted directly on the plaintiff by the de-
fendant. Lord v. Manchester St. Ry., 74 N.H. 295, 67 At. 639 (1907) 5 Twomley v.
Central Park N. & E.R.R., 69 N.Y. x58 (1877) (defendant's negligent conduct caused
plaintiff to jump for his lifeY; Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431
(93) Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 16z App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 0914)
(plaintiff fainted and fell) Freedman v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 299 Mass. 246, 12
N.E.zd 739 (1938) (impact rule does not preclude recovery for injury sustained from
the jump or the fall, even where the injury comes from a wrenching of the body rather-
than from external contact). See Smith, supra note io at 317, for a more extensive
collection of similar cases.
2) The rule is satisfied by the most trivial of impacts. Homans v. Boston El. R.R.,.
x8o Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (x9o2) (slight bump against seat) 5 Spade v. Lynn &
B.R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899) (second trial) (slight blow) 5 Porter v.
Delaware L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 At. 86o (19o6) (dust in eyes); Morton v
Stack, 122 Ohio St. z15, 17o N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke).
Other limitations are i) the burial right cases, 2) the contract relationship cases, 3)
the immediate physical injury cases, 4) the workmen's compensation cases, 5) the food
cases, 6) the wilful or wanton injury cases, and 7) the right of privacy cases. For art
exhaustive treatment of these limitations see McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability
in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 32-65 (x949). See also 2 HARPER & JAMES,,
ToaRs § x8.4 at p. 1033 (956).
The New York Court of Appeals in the case of Dixon v. New York Trap Rock
Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944), used the label "nuisance" in permitting-
recovery, without ever mentioning "impact."
" Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,.
350 U.S. 947 (1955) (Texas law applied); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni,.
x5 Ala. App. 36, 73 So. 2o5 (1916); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(951) 5 Cash in v. Northern P.R. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Chiuchiolo.
v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, i5o At. 540 (1930).
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New York Court of Appeals itself in Comstock v. Wilson14 where it
was held that the slightest impact would be sufficient to satisfy the
rule.' 5 Other courts, ignoring Mitchell and its misbegotten progeny
altogether, adopted a more enlightened approach and proceeded to allow
recovery on general tort doctrines of negligence and proximate cause."
In recent years most jurisdictions have taken this position."7
Three major reasons were given by the New York Court of Appeals
for its holding in the Mitchell case. First the court said that since the
plaintiff could not recover for mere fright, she could not recover for
injuries resulting therefrom. This is plainly non-sequitur reasoning.18
42.57 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (ig3). For other cases adopting this limitation
see note 12 supra.
"
5 Plaintiff was sitting in her husband's car when it was negligently struck from
behind by the defendant. The collision was minor, causing a moderate noise or
"grating sound." Mrs. Comstock was only jarred by the trivial impact. She got out
of the car to take defendant's name and license number. She then fainted and fell to
the sidewalk and died within twenty minutes from a fractured skull. Ibid.
"8 (A number of courts have held, and it is probably now the accepted rule in a
majority of the jurisdictions where the question has been passed upon, that where
definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional stress wrong-
fully caused by the defendant, he may be held liable for such physical consequences
notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon the plaintiff at the time of the
mental shock." Annot., 64 A.L.R.zd ioo, 143 (x959). This recent annotation then
proceeds to list all the jurisdictions following this majority rule, and the leading cases
in each jurisdiction.
"7See note x6, supra. The RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 436(7) (1931) adopted the
present majority rule, but added the following caveat: "The Institute expresses no
opinion that the unreliability of testimony necessary to establish the causal relation
between the actor's negligence and the other's illness or bodily harm may not make it
proper for the court of a particular jurisdiction to refuse, as a matter of administrative
policy, to hold the actor liable for harm to another which was brought about in the
manner stated in the Subsection." However, in the 1948 Supplement the caveat to
§ 436(2) was deleted, the drafters stating that § 436(2) should now be accepted with-
out reservation because of the trend toward allowing recovery and the insubstantial
reasons supporting the "impact" rule.
American courts have been much slower than the English courts to allow recovery
for injuries induced by fear for another. Compare Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis.
603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) with Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, x65 Atl. i8z
(1933). One commentator suggests that, Conce accepting the view that a plaintiff
threatened with an injurious impact may recover for bodily harm resulting from shock
without impact, it is easy to agree with Atkin, L. J., that to hinge recovery on the
speculative issue whether the parent was shocked through fear for herself or for her
.children 'Would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence.' " Magruder, Mental
and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1039
(1936), quoting from Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 341, 157.
8 "The doctrine of Mitchell v. Railway that since fear negligently caused is not
actionable, consequences of such fear are not compensable, is a complete non-sequitur,
[Vol. i96z: xx5
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Second, it was said that no proximate cause can be shown between the
fright and the physical injury. This argument has long since been
disproved.19 The last reason given by the court in Mitchell and the
only one that retains any life today is the public policy argument that
the "impact" requirement is a guard against a flood of fraudulent
claims" The dissent in Battalla would have reaffirmed Mitchell on
this ground. 1 What evidence there is, however, indicates that this
devoid of legal vitality." Smith, supra note io at 211. Smith explains his conclusion
as follows: "This erroneous argument proceeds as follows: First, the court assumes
correctly that mere fright negligently caused is not actionable; ergo injury which is a
consequence of fright being one step further removed from defendant's conduct is a
fortiori too remote to be compensable. But the true reason for not compensating
simple fright is that it involves no measurable damage and this reason vanishes if
physical injury ensues." Id. at 208 n.34. See also Magruder, supra note 17 at 1036.
"0 "All these objections have been demolished many times, and it is threshing old
straw to deal with them." PRossER, ToRTs, § 37, at 176-177 (2d ed. 1955), citing
in n.88: Bohlen, The Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without
Impact, 41 AU. L. REc. 141 (1902); Campbell, Injury Without Impact, 1951 INS.
L.J. 654; Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. RnV. 497
(1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761, 873 (s933); Hallen, Damages
for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REv. 253 (1932);
Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Dis-
tress, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426; Magruder, supra note iT; McNiece, supra note 12;
Smith, supra note io.
So "It is now more or less generally conceded that the only valid objection against
recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which
has loomed very large in the opinion as an obstacle." Id. at 177. See Bohlen, Fifty
Years of Torts, 5o HARV. L. REV. 725, 733 (1937); Wilson, The New York Rule as
to Nervous Shock, ii CoPRNELL L.Q. 512, 513 (1976); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d oo, 113
(x959). Holmes, in Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N.E. 380
(1899), said the "impact" rule was not put as a logical deduction from general prin-
ciples of liability in tort, but as a limitation of those principles on purely practical
grounds. In Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905),
the court predicted terrible results if recovery for anything as speculative as mental
distress were allowed. And as late as 1958, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that
to allow recovery "1... would open a Pandora's box." Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161,
168, 142 A.ad 263, 266 (1958).
" "Illogical as the legal theoreticians acknowledge this rule to be, it was Justice
Holmes who said that the life of the law has not been logic but experience." Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting in Battalla v. State, 176 N.E. 2d at 73z. The dissent continues:
"These statements in the Mitchell opinion are not archaic or antiquated, but are even
more pertinent today that when they were first stated. At a time like the present, with
constantly enlarging recoveries both in scope and amount in all fields of negligence
law, and when an influential portion of the Bar is organized as never before to promote
ever-increasing recoveries for the most intangible and elusive injuries, little imagina-
tion is required to envision mental illness and psychosomatic medicine as encompassed
by the enlargment of the coverage of negligence claims to include this fertile field....
Courts and juries become prone to accept as established fact that fright has been the
.argument is also inadequate. In those jurisdictions not requiring any
impact, the courts have not been flooded with a deluge of claims, and
there is no authority to indicate that any substantial amount of fraud
has occurred. 2
In abandoning Mitchell and its rationale, the New York Court of
Appeals has given effect to the sound principle that "it is fundamental
to our common law system that one may seek redress for every sub-
stantial wrong"2' To deny recovery for a substantial injury out of fear
that to allow recovery would open the door to a flood of fraudulent
claims shows a distrust in the ability of the law to test the validity
,of a plaintiff's claim.24 As the court in Battalla states:
. . . the question of proof in individual situations should not be the arbitrary
basis upon which to bar all actions .... In the difficult cases, we must look
to the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely to an extent on the con-
temporary sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of the court
cause of mental or physical consequences which informed medical men of balanced
judgment find too complicated to trace. Once a medical expert has been found who,
for a consideration, expresses an opinion that the relationship of cause and effect exists,
courts and juries tend to lay aside critical judgment and accept the fact as stated."
d. at 732, 733.
' "In so far as the volume of litigation is reflected in the published reports, it
does not seem that the courts in those jurisdictions which recognize the right of action
have suffered substantially more 'flooding' than the conservative courts." Annot., 64.
A.L.R.2d ioo, 112 n.7 (1959). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note x2 at
1034; McNiece, supra note 12 at 30-31. But cf. Smith, supra note so at 303, con-
-tending that the net balance of justice from the years i8go to 1944 would have been
greater had redress been denied in all cases of alleged injury from psychic stimuli.
Smith, supra note io at 3oo n.296, points out that the "impact" requirement does
have some relevancy but only as an evidentiary factor bearing upon the reasonableness
of the plaintiff's physic response.
1 76 N.E.zd at 730.
2, "To their credit let it be said that the courts have been entirely frank in stating
their reasons for departing from the customary rule. Uniformly, these statements show
a basic distrust of the legal machinery as a measuring device. Ordinarily it is-not
indicated whether the distrust arises from the supposed credulity of the jury, or from
the similar liability that the jury will be unduly swayed by their own emotions, or
possibly from the feeling that in such a case no reliance may safely be placed upon
the word of interested litigants, who know it will be impossible to impose any effective
check upon their testimony. But there usually is the unequivocal assertion that there
is no guarantee of the actuality of causation in such a case, and that therefore the
customary tests for fixing responsibility must be disregarded. In other words, legal
theory must yield to practical experience. The rule therefore is purely pragmatic, and
finds justification only to the extent that it is necessary to invoke such an exception to
keep the machinery of the law from working harm." Wilson, supra note 2o at 5x3.
See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note i9 at 1775 Bohlen, supra note 2o at 733; Annot., 64.
A.L.R.zd xoo, 113 (.959).
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and jury to weed out the dishonest claims. Claimant should, therefore, be
given an opportunity to prove that her injuries were proximately caused by
defendant's negligence. 25
Even if it is granted that there is a danger of fraudulent claims, it is just
as likely, if not more so, that there will be fraudulent claims under the
"impact" rule as it exists today.20 As to the argument that already
crowded dockets will be swamped with an alarming number of new
suits, it is sufficient to say that increased litigation "is no reason for a
court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction" 27 when there are wrongs
that need remedying.2"
25 176 N.E.±d at 731-32.
"Policing of proof has been the primary need, and the neglected task, in judicial
handling of cases involving alleged injury from psychic stimuli. . . . Purity of proof
can be protected, and the scales of justice balanced if courts will take judicial notice
of the requirements of scientific proof. . . ." Smith, supra note 1o at 303-304. See
Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, i5 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (19t6) i McNiece
supra note 12 at 73-74i Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d zoo, at 113 (.959).
"' "While the rule was designed to defeat fabricators, now with all the available
exceptions, it is possible for any fabricator to succeed in his case by merely including
the one necessary magic element to come within the bounds of an exception. The only
one who is defeated is the honest litigant who will not falsify, and who, if he does
not come squarely within an exception, will not obtain redress for an injury which
everyone agrees was foreseeable and culpably caused by another." McNiece, supra note
12 at 8o-Si. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 12 at 1035, claims that the
"impact" rule has come to lack substance and invite easy circumvention by the very
litigants whose fraud it was designed to guard against. The 1936 REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK LAW REV. COMM., 379, 450 states that there is good ground for believing
that the limitations to the "impact" rule breed dishonest attempts to mold the facts so
as to fit them within the grooves leading to recovery. In Battalla, the court asserted
that "not only, therefore, are claimants in this situation encouraged by the Mitchell dis-
qualification to perjure themselves, but constant attempts to either come within an old
exception, or establish a new one, lead to excess appellate litigation." 176 N.E.zd at
731.
27 176 N.E.2d at 731.
28 "The increase in litigation argument is not persuasive. Courts are created to right
wrongs, and if a plantiff is otherwise entitled to redress, an increase in the burden
of the court is no sufficient reason for refusal." Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-AI Milepost
in the Law, x2 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 6 (1933). "It is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation'; and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon t&e
ground that it will give the court too much work to do." Prosser, Intentional I.
fliction of Mental Suaffering: .A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 874, 877 (1939). See
remarks of Holt, C.J., in Ashby v. White [1703] 2 Ld. Raym. 939, 955, 92 Eng. Rep.
iz6, 137: ". • . it is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of actions;
for if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too; for every man that
is injured ought to have his recompense."
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New York had advanced significantly by joining the large majority
of states that treat the tort of negligent infliction of mental disturbance
resulting in physical injury as any other tort. The Mitchell decision,
the leading decision in the major state upholding the minority view,
along with its limitations, has been soundly repudiated. It is hoped
that the remaining states still adhering to the "impact" requirement will
once again follow New York's lead and recognize that justice cannot
be done by rigid adherence to .n anachronistic rule of thumb.
